TTO-2026-0828-002 · August 28, 2026 Law EnforcementSupply Chain

Australian Federal Police and FBI Arrest Two Members of TeamPCP Supply-Chain Group — 1,000 Organizations Compromised, 500,000 Credentials Stolen

afp.gov.auRuben Ian Thomson 21Louis Michael Gaebler 2314 combined charges1,000+ organizations500,000 credentials stolen300GB exfiltratedTrivy LiteLLM Telnyx SAP TanStackEuropean Commission Mistral AI OpenAI GitHubAFP FBI WAPF joint operation

Summary

The Australian Federal Police, working with the FBI and Western Australia Police Force, arrested and charged two men on August 26, 2026 who are alleged to be members of TeamPCP, a cybercrime group responsible for a series of developer supply chain attacks that police say compromised more than 1,000 organizations worldwide, enabled the theft of more than 500,000 credentials, and caused the exfiltration of at least 300 gigabytes of data. Remediation costs are estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. Ruben Ian Thomson, 21, was arrested in Cottesloe, and Louis Michael Gaebler, 23, was arrested in Mandurah. The two men appeared in Perth Magistrates Court on August 27. They face a combined 14 charges including unauthorized modification of data, possessing and supplying data for use in computer offenses, failing to comply with law enforcement orders, and dealing with criminal proceeds worth $100,000 or more. TeamPCP carried out its attacks by injecting malicious code into open-source software packages hosted on public repositories. Developers who incorporated the affected packages into their own software unknowingly distributed the malicious code into their organizations' systems. High-profile attacks attributed to TeamPCP affected Trivy, LiteLLM, Telnyx, SAP, and TanStack packages. The group also breached the European Commission, Mistral AI, OpenAI, and GitHub. Parallel AFP and FBI investigations began in April 2026 after cybersecurity firms provided intelligence to law enforcement. Both Flare and independent security researcher Brian Krebs published separate investigations after the arrests linking the accused to online activity through reused aliases and overlapping infrastructure. Oligo Security traced TeamPCP's infrastructure back to 2020 activity previously tracked under different names.

Timeline

DateEvent
2020TeamPCP infrastructure traced back to activity previously tracked as TA-NATALSTATUS and IronErn by Oligo Security
Feb-Mar 2026TeamPCP exploits misconfigured Trivy workflow, steals service account token, then pushes malicious Trivy release through all distribution channels
Apr 2026AFP and FBI begin parallel investigations after cybersecurity firms flag the campaign
Aug 4, 2026Fresh npm wave using TeamPCP toolkit poisons keyv and cacheable packages
Aug 26, 2026AFP and Western Australia Police Force execute search warrants in Cottesloe, Hamilton Hill, and Mandurah — two arrested
Aug 27, 2026Ruben Ian Thomson and Louis Michael Gaebler appear in Perth Magistrates Court — 14 combined charges
Aug 28, 2026Flare and Brian Krebs publish separate investigations linking accused to online activity through reused aliases

Domain Intelligence

DomainScoreDKIMSPFDMARCStatus
afp.gov.au93.0Live
WarmBadge Intelligence Snapshot · Captured: August 28, 2026 UTC

Context

afp.gov.au scores 93.0 — one of the highest scores in The Trust Observatory's domain intelligence database, consistent with a federal law enforcement domain. The TeamPCP arrests represent the most significant law enforcement action against a developer supply chain threat actor group in 2026. The scale of impact — more than 1,000 organizations, 500,000 credentials, 300GB of exfiltrated data, hundreds of millions in remediation costs — from what police describe as the compromise of a small number of trusted software components illustrates the asymmetric leverage of supply chain attacks. Two individuals using open-source repository infrastructure achieved a global impact that would have required significantly greater resources through conventional intrusion methods. The arrests impose costs on the alleged actors but do not recover exfiltrated credentials, reverse the supply chain compromise, or guarantee that all affected organizations have identified their exposure.

Domain intelligence available at warmbadge.com.
The Trust Observatory · thetrustobservatory.com · August 28, 2026